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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
supporters to yield to the balancing supporters-here, those Justices
willing to examine the reasonableness of the physician's agreement.63
The author suggested that if individualized inquiry proves unworkable,
those in favor of a per se rule will have sufficient ammunition to sup-
port their case, and win a reversal.64
Given the complexity of the Maricopa case, the Court's unfamiliarity
with the effects of the physicians' agreement, and the novelty of the
issue, the decision to invalidate the agreement as a per se violation is
unwise. If a horizontal maximum price-fixing agreement is a boon to
consumers, few social policies would be effectuated by applying a per
se rule.
The Maricopa decision adds a degree of certainty to antitrust law at
an uncertain cost. It remains unclear whether the game of certainty
and efficiency is worth the candle of consumer protection.
S.E..
TORT LAW: DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS-By-
STANDER MAY RECOVER FOR MENTAL DISTRESS CAUSED BY WIT-
NESSING A NEGLIGENT ACT. Haughtv. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 (5th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 685 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff checked into
the hospital at the direction of defendant-physician when she went into
labor.' Attending nurses repeatedly phoned defendant to inform him
that plaintiff showed clear signs of fetal distress.2 Defendant, however,
to produce division"). See generally Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decision-making, 94
HARV. L. REv. 1127 (1981).
63. See Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 810.
64. Id
1. Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 685 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff's initial obstetrician referred her to defendant. Both doctors had examined plaintiff for
the duration of her pregnancy. When she checked into the hospital her baby was already eleven
days overdue. Id. at 294.
2. 681 F.2d at 294. Plaintiff arrived at the hospital at 10:30 p.m., at which time nurses at the
hospital notified the doctor that her contractions were moderate and that her cervix was not di-
lated. One and a half hours later, plaintif's contractions were irregular. At three a.m., nurses
noted that plaintiffs amniotic fluid had appeared and indicated the presence of meconium.
Meconium is dark green fluid and "is the matter excreted in the baby's first bowel movement" and
is "a symptom of fetal distress, indicating a compromise or interruption of the baby's oxygen
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chose not to go to the hospital3 until more than eight hours later, when
the symptoms of fetal distress increased.4 Upon his arrival at the hos-
pital, defendant examined plaintiff and recognized the severity of the
fetus' condition.' He nevertheless attended to his morning rounds and
performed an elective surgery on another patient.6  Thereafter,7 de-
fendant delivered plaintiff's baby by caesarean section. The baby was
born with severe brain damage." Plaintiff filed suit against the doctor9
supply." Id See id. at 294 n.l. The doctor was again notified. Defendant called the hospital one
hour later and ordered that the baby's heart rate be monitored and that plaintiff be administered a
labor-inducing drug. Nurses called the doctor again one hour later to report the baby's irregular
heart beat and the continued presence of meconium staining. See id. at 294 n.2.
3. Id. at 294. Defendant stated that he considered the meconium staining and readings
from the heart monitor to be "unreliable" and therefore did not feel it necessary to go to the
hospital. Id.
4. Id. The court noted that at 7:00 a.m., when defendant arrived at the hospital, "gross
meconium staining" was apparent. ld.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 295. Defendant stated that the cervix had not properly dilated enough for delivery
and he therefore increased the dosage of the labor-inducing drug. Id. at 294.
7. Id. Nurses informed ldefendant during the surgery that signs of "fetal heart deceleration"
were apparent. Thereafter the doctor ordered that plaintiff be prepared for surgery. He then
finished his elective operation.
8. Id. at 294. The court stated:
Upon delivery, Dr. Maceluch noted that the umbilical cord was wrapped three or four
times around the baby's neck; he also found gross meconium covering the baby's body
and in the baby's throat. These conditions confirmed Dr. Maceluch's pre-operative diag-
nosis of fetal distress. A nurse immediately incubated the baby to draw the meconium
from the throat. Although the baby then began to breath spontaneously and its color
returned, it was not in good general condition: its breathing suffered some retractions, its
physical functions were depressed, and it exhibited poor muscle tone. Because of these
problems, the baby was transferred to Fort Worth Children's Hospital for further treat-
ment.
A neonatologist at Fort Worth Children's Hospital diagnosed the baby as suffering
from severe perinatal asphyxia--that is, a severe deprivation of oxygen before, during, or
after birth-and from meconium aspiration syndrome--the distress caused by inhalation
of meconium into the lungs. The baby also suffered seizures, indicating damage to the
brain. And the baby's pH level was quite low, an acidotic condition often caused by
oxygen deprivation. Even more tragically, within three months the baby's head had
shrunk because of the atrophy of her brain. According to the neonatologist, the brain
damage was permanent and would necessitate continuing institutionalization for the
child. In short, Jamie Marie Haught was doomed to a life limited by extraordinarily
severe handicaps.
Id.
9. Asserting diversity jurisdiction, plaintiff filed suit against defendant and the referring ob-
stetrician for medical malpractice to recover "damages for the impaired condition of her daughter,
for medical expenses in connection with the child's birth and future care, for loss of the child's
future earning capacity and for appellant's own mental suffering over her daughter's impaired
condition." Id. at 293. Only the last count will be dealt with here.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/10
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for the mental anguish' ° she sustained as a result of witnessing" the
birth of her daughter in an "impaired condition."' 2 The trial jury ruled
in favor of plaintiff.' 3 The district court, however, deleted the jury's
award, asserting that Texas law did not allow an uninjured bystander
to recover for mental suffering.' 4 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed
and held: Under Texas law, a mother may recover, under the general
negligence principle of forseeability, for emotional damages resulting
from witnessing the tortious delivery of her child.'5
The issue of whether a witness may recover damages for emotional
distress suffered as a result of witnessing a tortiously caused injury to
another has been controversial.' 6 Courts have long feared that 'a pleth-
10. The terms "mental anguish," "emotional distress," and "mental suffering" will be used
interchangeably to connote "all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief,
shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965). A student author noted that these
phrases have been described in a variety of ways, all of which have "vague meanings." 25 VILL.
L. REV. 195, 196 n.9 (1979). For example, Black's Law Dictionary has no definition for emotional
distress but describes mental anguish as "the mental suffering resulting from the excitation of the
more poignant and painful emotions, such as grief, severe disappointment, indignation, wounded
pride, shame, public humiliation, despair, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 889 (5th ed., 1979).
According to one commentator,
[Elmotional distress may be defined as a reaction to a traumatic stimulus which may be
physical, psychic, or both.
The reaction itself can be broken down into primary and secondary stages. The pri-
mary stage is the individual's initial reaction to the traumatic stimulus, and is normally
of short duration without lasting ill effects. By way of contrast, the secondary reaction,
or traumatic neurosis as it is commonly termed, develops after the primary stage has
diminished and can entail severe, long-lasting ill effects. There are various types of sec-
ondary reactions, and they can be classified according to their severity. Although there is
no pathological basis for the development of a traumatic neurosis, there is no doubt,
from a medical viewpoint, that such a neurosis can cause severe impairment of a person's
normal life functions. The affected individual has no control over the debilitating effects
of such a neurosis as it is the unconscious organism's means of reacting to a severe emo-
tional shock.
Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm to Bystanders-Should Recovery Be Denied, 7
ST. MARY'S L.J. 560, 562-63 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
11. The court of appeals noted that the issue is whether "[plaintiff) can recover for the mental
anguish she suffered because of the birth of her child in a defective condition, as distinguished
from [plaintiffs] suffering caused by the labor and delivery." 681 F.2d at 295.
12. Id. at 293.
13. The trial jury awarded $118,000 to plaintiff for her emotional suffering and a total of
$1,355,000 for the other counts sued upon. Id. at 293. See supra note 9.
14. 681 F.2d at 295.
15. Id. at 302. See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
16. "'IT]he authorities are in a state of dissension probably unequalled in the law of torts;
extending from no right to recover, to right to recover, 'where the plaintiffs' emotional disturbance
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ora of litigation,17 fraudulent and trivial claims,1 8 and unforseeable and
unlimited liability for defendants' 9 would result if courts recognized
such a cause of action.20 As a result, three distinct theories emerged to
deal with these concerns and to provide for recovery in very limited
was or should have been reasonably forseeable to the defendant.'" Covington v. Estate of Foster,
584 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
As one commentator noted:
In the ten-year period from 1968, eighty-two cases were decided by appellate courts on
the issue of recovery of damages for mental anguish by those observing tortious activity.
This was four times the number of recorded appellate cases decided in the previous fifty-
six years. The evidence is persuasive that the right to recover damages for mental
anguish by those observing tortious activity has become a theory of legal liability of
interest to attorneys-at-law in recent times and that this interest is increasing and gaining
support.
Lantry,An Expanding LegalDuty: TheRecoveryofDamagesforMentalAnguish By Those Observ-
ing TortiousActivity, 19 AM. Bus. LJ. 214, 219 (1981).
Adding further fire to the controversy, the Restatement has refrained from taking a clear posi-
tion on the issue.
Caveat: The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether an actor whose conduct is
negligent as involving an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to a child or spouse
is liable for an illness or other bodily harm caused to the parent or spouse who witnesses
the peril or harm of the child or spouse and thereby suffers anxiety or shock which is the
legal cause of the parent's or spouse's illness or other bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 caveat (1965).
17. Many courts and commentators have stated that if bystander recovery were allowed, a
"flooding of litigation" would result. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 614-15, 249
N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558-59 (1969); Joseph, Dillon's Other Leg." The Extension of the
Doctrine Which Permits Bystander Recoveryfor Emotional Trauma and Physical Injuries to Actions
Based on Strict Liability in Tort, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1979); Note, Limiting Liability For the
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: The "Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REV.
847, 851 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limiting Liability]; Note, Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tionalDistress: Keeping Dillon in Bounds, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1235, 1238 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Negligent Infliction].
18. See Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897), overruled,
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1987)); Manic v. Matson Oldsmobile-
Cadillac Co., 378 Mich. 650, 655, 148 N.W.2d 779, 781-82 (1967); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151
N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896); Lantry, supra note 16, at 220; Joseph, supra note 17, at
118; Note, Limiting Liability, supra note 17, at 847; Note, Negligent Infliction, supra note 17, at
1238 n.23.
19. See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 175-85, 404 A.2d 672, 687-92 (1979) (Roberts, J., dissent-
ing). As early as 1897 the courts' concern was that any rule allowing recovery for mental distress
would be arbitrary, unfair, and impossible to administer. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R.,
168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), overruled, Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d
1295 (1978). See also Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 730, 441 P.2d 912, 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 74
(1968) (stating that, according to those courts denying recovery, the "definition of liability being
impossible, denial of liability is the only realistic alternative").
20. Although the trend is reversing, it took a long time for "courts to recognize a cause of
action based upon observation of negligently caused injury to another causing emotional shock
[or] physical injuries to the observer." Joseph, supra note 17, at 4. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn &
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/10
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instances.2' The first theory, the "impact rule," provided that a by-
stander could not recover for mental distress unless he himself was
physically injured by the tortfeasor's act.22 The impact rule failed,
Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285,47 N.E. 88 (1897), overruled, Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555,
380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
Prior to 1970, only three cases had held in favor of allowing recovery where the plaintiff suf-
fered no physical injury. Lantry, Propositioning the Courts, 8 AM. Bus. L.J. 209, 212 (1970). One
court which allowed recovery was reversed 66 years later on the grounds that such a cause of
action was not recognizeable. Id See Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912),
rev'd, Slovensky v. Birmingham News Co., 358 So. 2d 474 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978). For other exam-
ples of the see-saw effect of the law in some states, see Lantry, supra note 16, at 214 n.3.
The problem in this area has been the difficulty in ascertaining whether a bystander has a legal
right to recover for what he sees. See Comment, supra note 10, at 566-67 (1975). As stated in
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., "[blefore negligence can be predicated on a given act, back of the act
must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining. .. " 248 N.Y. 339, 346, 162
N.E. 99, 100 (1928) (quoting West Virginia Central & P.Ry. Co. v. State, 96 Md. 652, 666, 54 A.
669, 671 (1903)). Duty is "the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say
that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 325-26
(14th ed. 1971).
Although "a natural sense of justice" seems to require recovery, see Lantry, supra note 16, at
215, there have been arguments, in addition to those discussed above, that recommend no recov-
ery. First, derived from a fear of fraudulent claims, critics have noted that proof of both mental
damages and proximate cause are impossible to determine without resort to speculation. See id at
220; Note, Limiting Liability, supra note 17, at 469-70; 25 VILL. L. REv. 195, 197 n.13 (1979). See
also infra note 42 and accompanying text.
Second, other critics have argued on the principle of stare decisis that a cause of action should
not lie because there is no precedent for such a decision. See, e.g., Shurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash.
2d 652, 658, 497 P.2d 937, 941 (1972) (Finley, J., dissenting). One commentator, however, sug-
gested that stare decisis arguments ignore the legal system's response to "changing conditions."
Joseph, supra note 17, at 5.
21. Note, Limiting Liability, supra note 17, at 849. See also Comment, supra note 10, at 566-
67.
22. See, ag., Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.
R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N.E. 694 (1897); Spade Y. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E.
88 (1897), overruled, Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled, Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
The impact rule tried to prevent fraud by ensuring that only those who had suffered physical
injury could bring a claim. Damages, absent physical injury, would be too hard to assess. See
Comment, supra note 10, at 560 (1975).
In addition, early courts favored denying recovery for emotional distress because there was no
precedent for it. See e.g., Lehman v. Brooklyn City R.R., 47 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 355, 356 (1888).
The impact rule provided the needed transition from traditional physical injury cases by
keeping the new action for emotional distress damages within the framework of the old
action for physical damages. By allowing recovery for emotional distress which accom-
panied physical injury, the traditional concept of physical injury was broadened to in-
clude such distress.
Note, Recovery For Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress: Changing The Impact Rule In Indi-
ana, 54 IND. L.J. 467, 467 (1979).
Washington University Open Scholarship
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however, to prevent fraudulent claims. The majority of states, there-
fore, substituted the impact theory with the "zone of danger test."23
For a bystander to recover under this theory, he must "fear for his
threatened safety while occupying a zone of possible physical peril
before [he] may recover for negligently inflicted mental distress ...
There must be a physical invasion of [his] physical security. '24  The
majority of courts25 have adopted this theory as the best method of
controlling the outer limits of bystander recovery. 6 Like the impact
rule, however, the zone of danger test has met with criticism in the last
twenty years because of its "arbitrary"27 dismissal of persons with via-
ble claims who were unable to meet its rigid standards for recovery.28
23. Note, Limiting Liability, supra note 17, at 849. States made the substitution because
"plaintiffs devised tortured interpretations of the requirement, allowing the slightest physical im-
pact to be a springboard to get a bystanders recovery case into court. Moreover, as an aid to those
suffering true emotional distress in bystander recovery cases, the need to prove a physical impact
seemed irrelevant and arbitrary." Id See also Note, supra note 22, at 467-70 (impact rule did not
resolve problems like fraud and speculation); 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1171, 1172 (1981) (test requir-
ing impact for recovery can never be met by bystander watching tortious act). Nevertheless, the
rule is still followed in Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Indiana and Missouri. Note, supra note 22, at
470 n.24.
24. Flanary, Bystander Recovery in Texas, 44 TEX. B. J. 746, 747 (1981).
25. Owens v. Children's Memorial Hospital, 480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973); Welsh v. Davis,
307 F. Supp. 416 (D. Mont. 1969); Cograve v. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1965); Keck v.
Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402
(1941); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214
A.2d 12 (1965); Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960); Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d
678 (N.D. 1972); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969); Waube v. Warrington,
216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 313, 436
(1965). For a complete list of jurisdictions supporting the zone of danger test, see Lantry, supra
note 16, at 218 n.14.
26. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 618, 249 N.E.2d 419,424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554,
561 (1969).
27. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 733, 441 P.2d 912, 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75 (1969). See
e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 404, 520 P.2d 758, 762 (1974) ("artificial [bar] to recovery
for mental distress"); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1981) ("harshness and artifici-
ality of zone of physical danger test"); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 564, 380 N.E.2d
1295, 1300 (1978) (rule "lacks strong logical support"); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647,
653-54, 207 N.W.2d 140, 144 (1973) ("hopeless artificiality and harshness of the rule"); Portee v.
Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 96, 417 A.2d 521, 525 (1980) ("artful yet artificial approach"); Sinn v. Burd, 486
Pa. 146, 157, 404 A.2d 672, 683 (1979) (test is "overly restrictive and prevents recovery where it
should be had"); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (zone of danger test
creates "artificial distinctions").
28. See e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (mother and
daughter watched son hit and killed by car, but under the zone of danger rule only the sister could
recover because, unlike her mother, she was standing close to the decedent and was therefore in
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/10
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The most salient rejection of the zone of danger test came in the
landmark case of Dillon v. Legg.29 In Dillon, the California Supreme
Court3" rejected the zone of danger test in favor of the forseeable risk
of harm doctrine.3' Under this doctrine, "liability is predicat[ed] upon
a finding that the defendant's conduct created an unreasonable and for-
seeable risk of emotional harm32 to a normal person in the plaintiffs
position. ' 33  Thus, the tortfeasor owes a duty34  to the bystander
the zone of physical peril). See also Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 658, 406 A.2d 300, 307 (1979)
("zone of danger rule imposes unjust limitations on recovery and fails to protect worthy inter-
ests"); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 657, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (1975) (zone of danger rule
ignores "psychological reality" of what occurs if parent witnesses death of child). Commentators
have agreed on this issue. They have stated that the zone of danger fails to correct the problems
the impact rule left unresolved. See Note, supra note 22, at 472.
29. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). In Dillon, both the
mother and sister witnessed a car run over the younger sister as she crossed the street. Id. at 730,
441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74. The court rejected arguments that a cause of action should be
denied those suffering emotional distress simply because of a fear of a plethora of litigation. Id. at
736, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78 ("possibility that fraudulent assertions may prompt
recovery in isolated areas does not justify a wholesale rejection of the entire class of claims in
which that potentiality arises. . . interests of meritorious plaintiffs should prevail over aledged
administrative difficulties"). Accord Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106-07 (Iowa 1981).
The Dillon court advocated determinations of recovery on a case-by-case basis to deal with the
fears which proponents of the zone of danger rule were concerned with. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78. Accord Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa
1981).
30. In this split decision, Justices Traynor, Burke and McComb dissented.
31. 68 Cal. 2d at 748, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85. In doing so, the court overruled
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
For a discussion of the Dillon case and its implications, see Leibson, Recovery of Damages For
Emotional Distress Caused By Physical Injury To Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163 (1976-1977); Simons,
Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Between Calfornia and New York,
51 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1 (1976); Note, Negligent Infliction, supra note 17.
32. According to the court, two types of injuries are forseeable: physical injuries and "bodily
injury or sickness brought on by . . .the defendant's conduct even where the plaintiff is outside
the zone of physical danger." 68 Cal. 2d at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (quoting 2
HARPER & JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS 1035-36 (1956) (footnotes omitted).
33. Comment, supra note 10, at 561. As the District Court of Rhode Island stated:
The. . .appropriate and relevant approach in order to effect justice is to ask whether
the defendant or the plaintiff should more properly pay the costs of plaintiff's injuries.
When it is foreseeable to the defendant that the plaintiff may well experience the shock
of seeing an accident involving his child, he has the obligation of exercising reasonable
care to avoid the infliction of psychic injury, and a breach of such obligation should
result in his bearing of liability.
D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 821 (D. R.I.), ajJ'd, 481 F.2d 14 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973). See also Note, supra note 22, at 477-78. For a discussion of foresee-
ability of the plaintiff, see infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
34. At least one court called the concept of duty "elastic." D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F.
Supp. 810, 816 (D. R.I.), af'd, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973). Moreover,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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whether or not in the zone of danger, if a risk to the bystander was
clearly forseeable.35 In order to determine the forseeability of harm,
the court inquired whether plaintiff was near the accident scene, 36
whether plaintiff encountered a "direct emotional impact" arising from
her observance of the accident,37 and whether plaintiff had a close rela-
one court noted that "a bystander has an interest in mental tranquility that the law of torts should
protect in certain carefully delineated cases." Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 1981).
The court in Dillon recognized that "modem courts" do not wish to impose a duty on the
tortfeasor to the bystander. As the court explained, these courts assert that
[d]uty. . .must express public policy; the imposition of duty here would work disaster
because it would invite fraudulent claims and it would involve the courts in the hopeless
task of defining the extent of the tortfeasor's liability. In substance, they say, definition
of liability being impossible, denial of liability is the only realistic alternative.
68 Cal. 2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
35. Professor Prosser stated:
All ordinary human feelings are in favor of her action against the negligent defendant.
If a duty to her requires that she herself be in some recognizable danger, then it has
properly been said that when a child is endangered, it is not beyond contemplation that
its mother will be somewhere in the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (1971). Accord D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810,
821 (D. R.I.) ("we should not close our minds and that is what we do when we adopt a rule that
persons suffering fright from witnessing injury to another are invariably beyond the risk"), qaj'd,
481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973) (quoting Hopper v. United States, 244 F.
Supp. 314, 318 (D. Colo. 1965)).
36. This has been called "the least important factor" of the Dillon criteria because if "the
sensory factor is not satisfied, the location factor certainly will not be satisfied." Lantry, supra
note 16, at 223. See e.g., Parsons v. Superior Ct. of Monterey County, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146
Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978) (no recovery because accident occured behind "bend in road" and plaintiff
was out of sight); Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975) (no
recovery because plaintiff was in California when the accident occured in Hawaii). For other
examples, see Lantry, supra note 16, at 223.
37. One commentator noted that, to satisfy this test,
the plaintiff must experience a disabling shock. A state of general anxiety will not be
sufficient. What is contemplated is a sudden and brief event which results in a sensory
awareness of injury to a third party. While visual perception of the accident is not a
requirement, mere physical presence is not enough. Momentary delay in sensing the fact
of the accident is not fatal to the plaintiff's cause of action; but a delay as long as five
minutes may be.
The standard can be stated as follows: There must be a sensory shock, precipitated by
an awareness of the happening of an accident, which is fairly contemporaneous with the
accident itself. The application of the sensory requirement has acted as a safeguard
against the infinite potential for liability forecast by the detractors of California's case
law.
Lantry, supra note 16, at 225. See e.g., Madison v. Desert Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir.
1978) (no recovery to wife who witnessed "effects" of injury at later date); Amader v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (cannot recover for witnessing deterioration of
injured person; must be "discrete and identifiable traumatic event to trigger recovery"); Burke v.
Pan Am. World Airways, 484 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (plaintiff who allegedly suffered emo-
tional distress by witnessing plane crash of sister by ESP cannot recover); Aravz v. Gerhardt, 68
Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977) (plaintiff who observed injury five minutes after
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tionship with the victim.3"
The risk of forseeable harm doctrine has been well received in many
jurisdictions39 and has been heralded as the "modem rule"40 under
occurence not allowed recovery); Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Med. Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106
Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973) (observing worsening health of third party inadequate); Amodio v. Cunning-
ham, 182 Conn. 80, 438 A.2d 6 (1980) (no recovery for witnessing "deterioration" of daughter's
condition due to malpractice of doctor). But see Bliss v. Allentown Pub. Library, 497 F. Supp.
487, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (mother who turned to see statue crush daughter moments after accident
may recover as a "precipient witness" to prevent arbitrary rejection of claims). See also Lantry,
supra note 16, at 224-25; 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 1171, 1181 (1981).
The qualifications regarding time, distance, and blood relation, provide limits on recovery.
Compare Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969) (mother who
arrives seconds after accident may recover) with Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 868 (1974) (mother who arrives 30-60 minutes after accident may not recover because all
parents experience such post-accident trauma). For a discussion of these cases, see Comment,
supra note 10, at 568.
38. 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
As Lantry stated, the emotional attachments of the relationship and not the blood relation dic-
tate the operation of the Dillon court's third requirement. Lantry, supra note 16, at 222. Accepta-
ble ties have included foster child-mother, see Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of Cal., 55 Cal. App.
3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976), husband-wife, see Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d
1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977), ward-guardian, see Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137
Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977). Courts have not found the relationship of two friends sufficiently close to
warrant recovery. See Beanland v. Chicago R.I. & P. R.Y. Co., 480 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1973).
It is not uncommon for parents to witness their childrens' accidents. Smith, Relation of Emo-
tions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability For Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 239 n.152
(1944) ("If defendant's negligence injures a child of any age in his own yard or house, the likeli-
hood that relatives may witness the episode would seem to be a foreseeable risk"). Several courts
have adopted standards for determining the forseeability of the presence of a parent. These
include:
(1) age of the child;
(2) the type of neighborhood in which the accident occurred;
(3) the familiarity of the tortfeasor with the neighborhood;
(4) the time of day; and
(5) all other circumstances which would have put the tortfeasor on notice of the likely
presence of a parent.
D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 820 (D. R.I.), all'd, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied. 414 U.S. 1075 (1973); Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977);
Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 409, 520 P.2d 758, 765 (1974). These courts have expressly
adopted this additional criteria to determine the total forseeability of harm.
39. See Buckner v. Freightliner Corp., 403 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Okla. 1975); D'Ambra v.
United States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D. R.I.), afd, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075
(1973); Austin v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1979);
D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973); Kelley v. Kokua
Sales Supply Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975); Richey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 101 Ill.
App. 3d 439, 428 N.E.2d 596 (1981); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Culbert v.
Sampson's Supermarket Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555,
380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Williams v. Citizens Mut. Ins. Co. of Am., 94 Mich. App. 762, 290
N.W,2d 76 (1980); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J.
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which a bystander may recover for emotional distress.4 1 Proponents
have praised the rule because of its easy application and because it has
alleviated such problems as fraudulent claims, increased litigation, and
unlimited liability.
42
88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); Landreth v. Reed, 570
S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976). See
also Note, Bystander Recovery in Arizona for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 981 (1980); Comment, Duty, Forseeability, and the Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 33
ME. L. REv. 303 (1981); Comment, Portee v. Jaffee: Dillon Comes to New Jersey, 33 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1171 (1981); 25 VILL. L. REv. 195 (1979).
40. Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291, 297 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 685 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.
1982). See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
41. Whether plaintiff's alleged mental distress must be accompanied or evidenced by a physi-
cal injury is not clear. There is a split of opinion on this issue. For examples of cases where the
court has held that a physical injury must accompany the distress, see Dziokonski v. Babineau,
375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (1978); Tom v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 656-57, 207
N.W.2d 140, 145 (1973); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 653, 406 A.2d 300, 306 (1979); Dave
Snelling Lincoln Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923, 924-25 (rex. Civ. App. 1974). See also
Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107-08 (Iowa 1981) (dictum) ("compensable mental distress
should ordinarily be accompanied with physical manifestations of the distress").
For examples of cases where the court has not required the presence of a physical injury before
awarding recovery for mental distress, see Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616
P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Culbert
v. Sampson's Supermarket Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672
(1979). Courts that do not require the presence of an accompanying injury for recovery for
emotional distress, however, sometimes require that the mental distress be serious. See, e.g., Sinn
v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 168, 404 A.2d 672, 686 (1979) (dictum). One commentator stated that a
"medically diagnosed traumatic neurosis that has developed from an emotional shock should suf-
fice. . . [for] recovery." Comment, supra note 10, at 573. See also Note, supra note 22, at 477
(degree of mental distress is important in terms of weeding out insignificant claims based on "mi-
nor emotional shocks").
Courts that refute the need for evidence of an injury do so because: "First, the requirement in
its application is overinclusive since it permits recovery for demonstrably trivial mental distress
claims accompanied by physical symptoms. Second, it is underinclusive since serious distress is
arbitrarily deemed not compensable if not accompanied by physical symptoms. Third, such a rule
encourages 'extravagant pleading and distorted testimony."' Culbert v. Sampson's Supermkt.,
Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982) (quoting Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 929,
616 P.2d 813, 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 838 (1980)).
42. The Dillon forseeability analysis eliminates earlier concerns of unlimited liability because
"[m]ost bystander recovery cases do not exhibit bizarre chains of events that reasonable persons
could not expect. To the contrary, it seems clear that the average person who has witnessed the
death or injury of another would be emotionally upset, regardless of whether [he] was in danger."
Note, Limiting Liability, supra note 17, at 851 (footnote omitted). Problems of measuring damages
and of proof are not unresolveable and should not bar the cause of action. Joseph, supra note 17,
at 8-12. The problem of fraudulent claims is unlikely because emotional distress can be medically
proven. See 25 VILL. L. REv. 195, 197 n.13 (1979). Contra infra note 58 and accompanying text.
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In Haught v. Maceluch ,3 the Fifth Circuit became the latest convert
to the doctrine of forseeable harm. Noting that the Texas44 Supreme
Court had never directly addressed this issue,45 the Fifth Circuit ana-
lyzed the treatment of the issue at all levels of the state court system46
and concluded that Texas would follow the modem rule of measuring
bystander recovery.47 The court then proceeded to apply the Dillon
criteria.48 Although the court had no trouble determining that plaintiff
had satisfied the first and third criteria for forseeability,49 there was a
question of whether she had contemporaneously perceived the acci-
43. 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 685 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1982). Circuit Judge
Thornberry authored the opinion.
44. Sitting as a federal court in a diversity action, the Fifth Circuit was "bound to follow the
substantive law of Texas." 681 F.2d at 295. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
45. 681 F.2d at 296. The court noted that the Texas Supreme Court had ruled on relevant
issues and had "accepted 'the uninjured bystander' cause of action as a matter of general negli-
gence law." Id. at 297 n.6. For example, the Texas Supreme Court had applied general negli-
gence principles to early claims for mental distress with varying results. The court examined the
following cases: Kaufman v. Miller, 414 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1967) (case-by-case analysis to deter-
mine recovery); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944 (1900) ("where a physical
injury results from fright or other mental shock. . . the injured party [can] recover his damages
provided. . . injury. . . [was forseeable]"); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890) (by-
stander allowed to recover for emotional distress after witnessing tortious assault which caused her
to miscarry baby). See Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d at 296-302. For a discussion of the devel-
opment of Texas law in this area, see Flanary, supra note 24, at 746-50.
46. The court announced that the doctrine of forseeable harm to determine bystander recov-
ery had "firm roots in Texas Supreme Court jurisprudence, and the Court of Civil Appeals." 681
F.2d at 296. The court examined the following Texas Court of Civil Appeals cases: Bedgood v.
Madalin, 589 S.W.2d 797 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 600 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1980) (father in
backyard who heard sound like watermelon being dropped from great height in front yard, which
was impact of son hit by car, can recover under forseeability principles); Covington v. Estate of
Foster, 584 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) ("not unforseeable as a matter of law that" person
who drives recklessly might hit car with children and parents in it thereby causing parents emo-
tional distress); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (under principles of
forseeability, plaintiff who did not see her sister drown but who saw attempts to resuscitate her at
nursery school could recover); Dave Snelling Lincoln Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974) (mother in back seat who saw son fall out of car and get run over could recover
for mental distress).
47. 681 F.2d at 298. The court cited Hott v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 636 F.2d 1073, 1074 (5th
Cir. 1981) for the proposition that "[a] decision of the Court of Civil Appeals is controlling on
questions of state law in this court, absent strong indication that the Texas Supreme Court would
decide the issue differently." 681 F.2d at 298.
48. 681 F.2d at 298-302. According to the court, a Texas plaintiff cannot recover for emo-
tional injuries unless he has a resultant physically manifested injury. Id. 249 n.9. See supra note
41.
49. 681 F.2d at 299. The court noted that "not only was [plaintiff] located near the scene of
the accident [but] was in some sense the scene itself." Id.
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dent50 because she had not actually witnessed the precise injury to her
daughter." The court reasoned that this question should be resolved
not by asking whether the plaintiff actually witnessed the accident, but
by focusing on plaintiff's "experiential perception of the accident" and
not the specific injury.52
Using this standard, the court found that plaintiff had had an experi-
ential perception of the tortious delivery of her child.5 3 The court
stressed, however, that a determination of recovery in bystander cases
should not depend on whether the plaintiffs case strictly meets the Dil-
lon criteria.54 Rather, the proper inquiry should focus on whether the
plaintiff s emotional distress was clearly forseeable 5
The Fifth Circuit's56 use of the doctrine of forseeable harm to deter-
mine a bystander's right to recover for emotional distress will provide
greater momentum to the general acceptance of this doctrine in other
jurisdictions.5 7 The doctrine is not, however, without its critics58 and
50. The district court ruled as a matter of law that, absent this factor, plaintiffs claim was
barred. Id. at 299-300.
51. Id. at 299. The court did not emphasize that this factor might not be met. The court
stated that "even in the absence of [plaintiffs] contemporaneous perception of the accident, the
Texas courts would not necessarily bar [plaintiff's] cause of action." Id. Moreover, the court
added that a finding of forseeability could easily be predicated on the facts of this case and that
Dillon should not be treated as a categorical rule of factors, but a rule of forseeability. Id. at 300.
52. Id.
53. Id. The court noted that the factors in bystander cases are not always so neat. For exam-
ple, in some cases where recovery has been allowed plaintiff has "seen both the defendant's negli-
gent act and the injury that it causes to a third person." Id. In such cases, there is a
contemporaneous perception of the event which causes the mental distress. In other cases, how-
ever, plaintiff arrives at the accident scene moments after the injury has occured and still is al-
lowed to recover. See Bedgood v. Madalin, 589 S.W.2d 797, 802-03 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). See
cases cited supra note 37. Using these cases as precedent, the court concluded that plaintiff had
contemporaneously perceived the negligently inflicted childbirth because she was aware of the
severity of the situation and the notable absence of the doctor. Plaintiff was "brought so close to
the reality of the accident as to render her experience an integral part of it." 681 F.2d at 301
(quoting Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)).
54. Such a mode of analysis would force the court to "loose sight of the forest for the trees."
681 F.2d at 301.
55. Id.
56. The Fifth Circuit also reviewed the doctor's standard of care to determine if he was held
properly liable. For a discussion of these issues, see id. at 302-06.
57. Over 10 years ago, one commentator predicted that this doctrine would become the ma-
jority rule. See Lantry, Propositioning the Courts, 8 AM. Bus. L.J. 212, 215 (1970). See also Bar-
rera v. E.I. DuPont de NeMours & Co., 653 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 661 F.2d 931
(5th Cir. 1981) ("tendency towards expanding concepts of liability and constricting defenses...
[in] the cognate area of bystander action").
58. The dissent in Dillon raised some problems caused by the doctrine:
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many have already suggested the use of alternative methods5 9 to reduce
and more definitively determine a defendant's potential liability in this
area.60  An examination of future state cases will indicate whether the
modem rule will indeed become the majority rule.
S.E W.
What if the plaintiff was honestly mistaken in believing the third person to be in danger
or to be seriously injured? What if the third person had assumed the risk involved?
How "close" must the relationship be between the plaintiff and the third person? I.e.,
what if the third person was the plaintiff's beloved niece or nephew, grandparent, fiance,
or lifelong friend, more dear to the plaintiff than her immediate family? Next, how
"1near" must the plaintiff have been to the scene of the accident, and how "soon" must
shock have been felt? Indeed, what is the magic in the plaintiff's being actually present?
Is the shock any less real if the mother does not know of the accident until her injured
child is brought into her home? On the other hand, is it any less real if the mother is
physically present at the scene but is nevertheless unaware of the danger or injury to her
child until after the accident has occurred? No answers to these questions are to be
found in today's majority opinion.
68 Cal. 2d at 749-50, 441 P.2d at 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (Burke, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original). See also Flanary, supra note 24, at 749.
59. Suggested alternatives include "duty definers," see Joseph, supra note 17, at 16-22, "the
emotional unpreparedness rule", see Note, Limiting Liability, supra note 17, at 866-68, and new
formulations of the Dillon criteria. For example:
1. The bystander was located near the scene of the accident.
2. The emotional distress resulted from a direct emotional impact from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident
from others after its occurrence.
3. The bystander and the victim were husband and wife or related within the second
degree of consanguinity or affinity.
4. A reasonable person in the position of the bystander would believe, and the by-
stander did believe, that the direct victim of the accident would be seriously injured or
killed.
5. The emotional distress to the bystander must be serious.
Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d at 108.
60. For a discussion of bystander recovery and strict liability, see Joseph, supra note 17, at
42-50.
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